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Toby S. Goldbach and Valerie P. Hans 
Cornell University Law School, Ithaca, NY, USA 
Overview 
“Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials” describes the 
widespread practice of including ordinary citi- 
zens as legal decision makers in the  criminal 
trial. In some countries, lay persons serve as 
jurors and determine the guilt and occasionally 
the punishment of the accused. In others, citizens 
decide cases together with professional judges in 
mixed  decision-making  bodies.  What  is  more, 
a number of countries have introduced or 
reintroduced systems employing juries or lay 
judges, often as part of comprehensive reform in 
emerging democracies. Becoming familiar with 
the job of the juror or lay citizen in a criminal trial 
is thus essential for understanding contemporary 
criminal justice systems in many countries. This 
entry reviews procedures for selecting jurors and 
lay judges and outlines lay participation in fact 
finding and in sentencing phases of the criminal 
trial. It also assesses the promises and challenges 
of lay participation in law. Reviewing and evalu- 
ating the effects of the different approaches that 
countries have taken to incorporating lay citizens, 
it reflects on whether the goals of democratic 
deliberation are being met in both jury and lay 
judge systems. It concludes with suggestions for 
future directions for research. 
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Doing the Job of Democracy 
 
The custom of employing ordinary citizens as 
legal decision makers in criminal trials is wide- 
spread. Originating in early legal systems, this 
practice  has  continued   in   modern   times   as 
a vehicle for including a democratic element in 
law. In approximately 50 countries, ranging from 
Australia to Kazakhstan to Spain and Sri Lanka, 
citizens serve as jurors, deciding cases in inde- 
pendent bodies separate from professional 
judges. In many other countries, such as Italy, 
Poland, and Japan, citizens participate as lay 
judges (alternately called lay assessors), deciding 
cases together with professional judges in mixed 
decision-making bodies. Whether citizens serve 
as jurors or lay judges often depends on whether 
the legal system derives from a common or a civil 
law tradition. Juries are more likely to act as 
independent decision makers in common law 
adversarial trials, whereas lay judges appear 
more often in civil law inquisitorial trials and 
tribunals (Thaman 2011). 
Delegating the task of adjudicating a criminal 
trial to ordinary citizens promotes democracy in 
both legal and political institutions. Laypersons 
bring the voice of the people to the law. They 
draw on their own life experiences, allowing trial 
decisions to more accurately reflect the society 
that the legal system serves. This is a form of 
representative democracy in legal institutions 
(Malsch 2009). When the trial is finished, lay 
citizens return to the community, sharing the 
lessons they learned about the law, ensuring an 
accountable and transparent legal system. 
Employing juries and lay judges supports and 
enhances democratic political institutions. Lay- 
persons act as a check on authority. They balance 
the power imbued in state officials such as pros- 
ecutors or professional judges. And by contribut- 
ing to decisions that directly affect the people, 
juries and lay judges engage in an act of self- 
governance, reestablishing the people’s sover- 
eignty. This act of self-governance in the legal 
realm affects political participation. As individ- 
uals perform the duties of a juror or lay judge, 
they become more connected to the world around 
them.  The  French  political  thinker  Alexis  de 
 
Tocqueville believed that jurors internalized the 
duties they owed to society and the role they 
ought to play in government. Writing in admira- 
tion of the US jury system, he observed that the 
jury communicates “the spirit of the judges to the 
minds of all the citizens” and that “this spirit, 
with the habits which attend it, is the soundest 
preparation for free institutions” (Tocqueville 
1835/1945, p. 289). 
Jurors and lay judges also act as conflict 
resolvers. They attend to the  conflict  between 
the state (as representative of the victim and the 
community)  and   the   defendant   by   reaching 
a verdict in cases that may feature difficult and 
often complex competing narratives. And, 
depending on the jurisdiction or type of crime, 
lay judges and juries may participate in punish- 
ment decisions for convicted defendants. 
Despite the important role that they play in the         J  
criminal  trial,  juries  and  lay judges  face chal- 
lenges on several fronts. First, critics argue that 
the evidence and legal arguments now being 
introduced in contemporary trials are too com- 
plex for untrained eyes. These critics question the 
lay participant’s ability to understand new tech- 
nologies and scientific methods such as DNA or 
mtDNA and accuse juries in particular of relying 
on expert credentials rather than evaluating the 
substance of expert testimony. A broad trend 
toward professionalization in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries deepened a mistrust of lay 
participation in the law and other expert domains. 
Professionals were thought to be superior to ordi- 
nary citizens because of their theoretically rich 
education, instruction in the practical skills of 
decision making, and greater adherence to ratio- 
nal scientific principles. Now, in a contemporary 
twist, modern technology invites new concerns 
about the soundness of lay decision making, with 
some worrying about jurors’ use of cell phones or 
Internet to obtain information about cases and 
parties that would otherwise not be available in 
the courtroom proceedings (Waters and 
Hannaford-Agor, in press). 
Moving from courtroom proceedings to 
posttrial coverage, a second concern about lay 
participation is evident in the way the public 
scrutinizes  criminal  trial  verdicts.  Media  and 
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members of the public often disparage jury deci- 
sion making following controversial judgments, 
especially in cases where a notorious defendant is 
found not guilty. The popular press in the United 
States conveyed public outrage following ver- 
dicts of not guilty for O.J. Simpson and    Casey 
B. Anthony, trials that were decades apart. Sim- 
ilarly, support for Spain’s recently introduced 
jury  system  dropped   precipitously   following 
a jury’s acquittal of a defendant who  was on  
trial for killing two police officers (Hans 2008). 
Remarkably, one of the greatest challenges to 
lay participation in legal decision making is the 
sharp   decline   in    criminal    trials.    Despite  
a constitutional right to trial by jury, in the United 
States, plea bargaining and other settlements 
resolve almost all criminal cases. As  a  result, 
the number of jury trials has declined in both 
state and federal courts. Today, US juries decide 
just 5–10 % of all criminal cases. In the United 
Kingdom, the number is even lower, at 1 % of 
cases. In a surprising contrast, a number of coun- 
tries outside the United States and the United 
Kingdom have recently introduced new lay par- 
ticipation systems, often as part of broad efforts 
to support emerging democratic systems (Hans 
2008; Kovalev 2010; Marder 2011). 
Historically, European countries transplanted 
all or part of their legal systems to their colonies. 
Thus, juries were found  in  legal  systems  in  
the  United  States  and   in   British   colonies   
in Africa, parts of India, Australia, New Zealand, 
and some Caribbean and South American coun- 
tries (Hans 2008; Vidmar 2000). Several coun- 
tries dismantled the institution postindependence, 
particularly where native populations saw jury 
verdicts as furthering the interests of colonizers 
or where the right to a jury trial was not extended 
to indigenous peoples. But now, citizen partici- 
pation is seeing a rebirth, particularly in countries 
that are democratizing following periods of 
authoritarian rule (Lempert 2007). Notable 
examples include Spain, which began conducting 
jury trials in the mid-1990s, as well as Russia 
(Thaman 2011). In fact several post-Soviet coun- 
tries, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and Azerbaijan, enshrined a right to trial by jury 
in their constitutions (Kovalev 2010). The newly 
 
independent country of Georgia modeled its jury 
system on US juries and held its first criminal jury 
trial in the fall of 2011. In the last decade, East 
Asian countries enacted court reforms which cre- 
ated new and innovative methods of lay partici- 
pation: Japan adopted a mixed court with lay 
judges, whereas South Korea introduced a jury 
system. Other countries, while not adopting the 
independent jury model, have altered their trial 
processes away from dossier-based inquisitorial 
approaches toward more adversarial oral evi- 
dence presentation to facilitate eventual citizen 
participation. 
Becoming familiar with the job expected of 
jury and lay citizens is therefore essential for 
understanding contemporary criminal justice sys- 
tems in many countries. This entry first describes 
the independent fact finding of jury systems and 
then turns to a consideration of mixed courts of 
lay and professional judges. It summarizes 
research evidence about how well lay decision 
makers function and reflects on whether the goals 
of democratic deliberation are being met. The 
entry concludes by considering contemporary 
challenges and future directions for research. 
 
 
Juries at Trial 
 
The trial by a jury of one’s peers dates back to 
thirteenth-century England. These early juries 
were composed of land-owning white men, who 
testified about their personal knowledge of local 
disputes. Over time the institution changed so 
that jurors functioned less like witnesses and 
more like fact finders. In England, distinct roles 
for judge  and  jury   developed   in   the   1700s. 
A similar evolution took place in the United 
States toward the end of the nineteenth century 
(Vidmar and Hans 2007). Formally, the judge 
determines the law and the jury applies that law 
to the facts as it finds them. However, in practice, 
the distinction between applying the law and 
finding facts is not always so clear. 
A sketch of the jury trial reveals a handful of 
basic steps, starting with selecting individuals 
from a pool of persons summoned to serve on  
the jury (National Center for State Courts   Jury 
Juries, Lay Judges,  and Trials 2719 J 
 
Topic Page). Once the trial is underway, the jury 
listens to the evidence presented and will alone 
make the decision about whether there is enough 
evidence to support a finding of guilt. If the 
defendant is found guilty, in some jurisdictions 
and some types of trials, the jury may be involved 
in sentencing the defendant. 
 
Jury Selection 
A large government-funded organization is seek- 
ing 12 thoughtful people for group decision- 
making. Applicants must be willing to put their 
regular lives on hold for a year or more in return 
for low pay and zero benefits. Out-of-pocket 
expenses will not be covered (Butler 2007 p. B1). 
 
This imaginary job advertisement for jury duty 
captures the challenges that confront judges and 
other tenured members of the court in their search 
for citizens to serve as jurors, particularly in 
lengthy trials. Selecting members of the jury, 
however, may be the most important stage of  
the trial  because  the  jury’s  ability  to  inject    
a democratic perspective into the legal system 
depends on its composition. A jury drawn from 
a representative cross-section of the population is 
in a better position to express the full range of the 
community’s views. Yet, for much of its history, 
juries have reflected the more privileged and elite 
segments of their communities. Men, whites, and 
those with more education, higher occupational 
status, and higher incomes were overrepresented 
on juries compared to their numbers in the 
population. 
In the last several decades, jury commis- 
sioners have taken advantage of technological 
advances to reform the summoning process in 
order to achieve more representative groups of 
prospective jurors. Commissioners combine lists 
of potentially eligible residents and send out sum- 
monses for jury duty to residents living in geo- 
graphically diverse areas. Some jurisdictions 
even use targeted replacement mailings to ensure 
representation from parts of the community that 
tend to have lower return rates. Governments 
have raised the compensation for jury service, 
especially for long trials when jurors may be 
away from their employment for a substantial 
period of time. While in many countries    these 
 
methods still fall short of producing fully repre- 
sentative groups, they are a decided improvement 
over the past when jurors served based on per- 
sonal recommendations or were handpicked by 
jury commissioners. 
The process of summoning a large group of 
eligible jurors begins the trial. While the specifics 
vary across jurisdictions, typically both the judge 
and the attorneys are able to remove individuals 
before finalizing the jury that will ultimately 
decide the case. In the United States, the judge 
has the ability to decide “for cause” challenges to 
eliminate clearly biased jurors, whereas attorneys 
have a limited number of “peremptory” chal- 
lenges that they may exercise without providing 
reasons. Other countries such as England and 
Wales do not permit peremptory  challenges.  
The Korean system allows each side five peremp- 
tory challenges and an unlimited number of chal-         J      
lenges   for   cause   (Park   2010).   In   Canada, 
subgroups of jurors determine whether other 
jurors are impartial or should be removed for 
cause. 
Providing a mechanism for removing appar- 
ently biased individuals from the jury helps to 
ensure the integrity and quality of the jury’s deci- 
sion. Nevertheless, opponents criticize the jury 
selection process, with some pointing to evidence 
that race and other impermissible factors infect it, 
and others doubting the ability of judges and 
lawyers to identify and remove biased jurors. In 
the United States, a robust field of jury consulting 
has developed to assist lawyers in selecting 
jurors; it is employed predominantly in high- 
profile criminal trials and with wealthy defen- 
dants (Tanovich et al. 1997; Vidmar and Hans 
2007). 
 
Juries as Fact Finders 
During the trial, the jury acts as a fact finder, 
working through witness testimony, exhibits and 
the lawyers’ arguments in order to uncover the 
facts of the case. Researchers interested in how 
juries process truncated and conflicting sketches 
of events use several theories to explain the jury’s 
fact finding role. The most common theory is the 
“story model,” in which jurors arrange the evi- 
dence into a narrative account. Other theoretical 
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explanations focus on the psychological pro- 
cesses of anchoring and adjustment. Jurors 
anchor on their initial perception but adjust their 
opinion about the probability of the event having 
occurred as new evidence is  presented  at trial. 
A final theory is that jurors integrate information 
by weighing relevant information and combining 
discrete pieces of evidence. Ideally, jurors would 
evaluate the strength and weakness of evidence 
using relevant and impartial criteria. However, 
research indicates that factors unrelated to the 
strength of the evidence influence some juries.  
In the aggregate, jurors are more likely to attri- 
bute accuracy to eyewitness identification when 
a witness displays confidence, even though this is 
not an indication of reliability. As well, juries 
tend to give more weight to identifications made 
by police officers. 
At its best, jury decision making embraces 
many of the features of deliberative democracy. 
Members of the jury hold a diverse set of view- 
points which can be brought forward and evalu- 
ated through reason-based discussion. Open 
discussion helps ensure that trial evidence is thor- 
oughly evaluated, that rival explanations are 
examined, and that mistaken recollections are 
corrected. Through this process of deliberation 
and discussion, the jury reaches binding conclu- 
sions on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. 
Empirical studies on group decision making con- 
firm some but not all of the predictions of deliber- 
ative democracy theory. Studies show that groups 
outperform individuals in recalling facts, in 
correcting errors, and in pooling information. 
However, studies also show that during the delib- 
erative process, once jurors are made aware of the 
majority view, they will tend to move in that 
direction, regardless of whether the view is to 
convict   or    acquit.    Other    studies    indicate 
a leniency bias, where jurors in a numerical minor- 
ity arguing for acquittal have more impact than  
a minority arguing for conviction. Either way, as 
the majority increases, so does the pressure on the 
minority to conform to the majority view. 
Several studies reveal that judges and juries 
agree on the verdict in a substantial majority of 
cases, and that when judges and juries disagree, it 
 
is for reasons other than the difficulty of the 
evidence. A recent study of the first  3  years 
since the introduction of jury trials in South 
Korea confirms these findings (Kim et al. 2013). 
While in most cases judges and juries agree on 
the verdict – 91.4 % of the time in South Korea – 
when they do disagree, juries tend to be more 
lenient than judges, perhaps because they have    
a more generous interpretation of reasonable 
doubt, because they sympathize with the defen- 
dant, or because they disagree with the law. 
Judges’ professional training and prior experi- 
ence deciding criminal cases are also  factors. 
The sizeable overlap between professional judges 
and juries should assuage concerns about jury 
incompetence. On the other hand, the research 
lends some support to beliefs that juries are  
more generous to criminal defendants than judges 
sitting alone. 
Juries instantiate civic duty and their work 
strengthens legal and political institutions. Jurors 
report higher regard for the institution following 
their  trial   experiences   (Diamond   1993).   In  
a national survey of over 8,000 former jurors in 
the United States, 63 % reported that they were 
more favorable about jury duty after serving. 
Other studies similarly show  enhanced  regard 
for the courts and for judges after jury service. 
Surveys of jurors in South Korea’s new advisory 
jury system show positive views of the experi- 
ence (Park 2010). 
Moreover, there may be a direct link between 
jury decision making and interest in politics  
(The  Jury  and  Democracy   Project   website). 
A multidisciplinary team conducted research on 
the salutary effects of jury service on civic par- 
ticipation (Gastil et al. 2010). An initial study of 
Thurston County, Washington, residents found 
that jurors who took part in deciding the verdict 
at trial voted more frequently in subsequent elec- 
tions than people who were called for jury duty 
but were dismissed, were alternates, or were on 
hung  juries  that  could   not   reach   a   verdict. 
A follow-up study conducted nationwide 
included a sample of more than 13,000 jurors. 
This latter study found that jurors who had been 
infrequent voters were more likely to vote  after 
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serving jury duty. In this case, it didn’t matter 
whether the jury had reached a verdict or not. 
The job of serving as a juror in a criminal trial 
does, however, come with a cost. Jurors experi- 
ence stress, especially following lengthy trials or 
in trials where the offense and potential punish- 
ment is severe (Anand and Manweiller 2005). In 
a 1998 study, jurors identified several sources of 
stress, including deciding on the verdict, jury 
deliberations, disruption to daily routine and 
dealing with lurid evidence (National Center for 
State Courts, 1998). A 2001 Canadian study 
revealed similar sources of stress, including 
reaching a verdict and the deliberation process. 
Canadian juries present a particular challenge for 
researchers, as they are prohibited by law from 
disclosing any information about jury proceed- 
ings. The closed nature of jury proceedings in 
Canada acts as an additional source of stress for 
these jurors, who are not able to process poten- 
tially emotional or difficult information with 
others (Chopra 2002). The responsibility placed 
on juries is particularly acute in murder trials. 
Jurors play a critical role in bringing legitimacy 
to punishments that take life or deprive liberty for 
life. However, murder trials can be lengthy and 
the evidence presented can be disturbing. For 
example, the multiple-victim murder trial of 
Robert “Willie” Pickton, who was suspected in 
the deaths of 26 women in British Columbia, 
Canada, lasted just over 9 months (Butler 2007). 
In order to address these issues, some courts 
provide psychological, psychiatric, or social 
work services to jurors following trial (Anand 
and Manweiller 2005; Chopra 2002). 
 
Juries at the Sentencing  Phase 
Even if a jury decides the verdict, it is not neces- 
sarily involved in sentencing. For most types of 
crimes in most US jurisdictions, professional 
judges have the sole responsibility for sentencing 
criminal offenders. In six US states, jury sentenc- 
ing is an option in felony trials and defendants 
may choose either judge or jury sentencing. How- 
ever, in capital cases, most US states give the 
decision on whether or not the defendant should 
be sentenced to death to the jury. In Canada, 
 
juries do not participate in sentencing offenders. 
Murder convictions carry automatic life 
sentences, and for other convictions, judges 
determine the sentence bearing in mind sentenc- 
ing ranges in the Criminal Code, the codified 
principles of sentencing, and previous similar 
cases. However, when a defendant is convicted 
of first- or second-degree murder charges, the 
jury can make a nonbinding recommendation of 
how long the defendant should remain ineligible 
for parole.  In  South  Korea,  juries  decide  on   
a sentencing recommendation and submit it to  
the judges. Similar to Canadian parole recom- 
mendations, Korean jury recommendations on 
sentencing are not binding (Park 2010). 
Judges and juries will experience the task of 
sentencing offenders differently in the United 
States.  In  many  jurisdictions,  judges consider 
statutory ranges, sentencing guidelines, and typ-          J       
ical sentences in similar cases as they determine 
an individual defendant’s sentence. In contrast, 
states often limit the information jurors receive 
about the offense, the offender, and sentencing 
guidelines. In Virginia, juries but not judges  
must impose the statutory minimum sentence. 
Ironically, jury sentencing may reduce the use of 
juries at trial, as prosecutors use the prospect of 
unfettered jury sentencing to encourage defen- 
dants to enter a plea before trial (King and Noble 
2004). 
 
 
Lay Judges and Mixed Courts 
 
In countries that follow the civil law tradition,  
lay judges (alternatively, lay assessors) sit in 
mixed courts and tribunals with professional 
legally trained judges. Lay judges serve jointly 
with professional judges in many European 
countries, including Germany, Austria, Den- 
mark, France, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, and Sweden, and in post-Soviet coun- 
tries including the former Czechoslovakia and in 
countries of the former Yugoslavia (Hans 2008; 
Kutnjak Ivkovic  ´ 2007). Several new systems of 
lay participation use the mixed court model: for 
example, Japan’s mixed court of lay citizens and 
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professional judges, Saiban-in Seido, and 
Argentina’s mixed court in Co´ rdoba  (Corey  
and Hans 2010). 
 
Selection of Lay Judges 
Similar to the way that jurors are selected, lay 
judges are ordinary citizens selected from a list of 
potential candidates who fulfill age, citizenship, 
literacy, or education requirements. For example, 
in Italy, lay judges must be Italian citizens of 
“good moral conduct,” between the ages of 30 
and 65 years, with at least a high school diploma 
(Catellani and Milesi 2006). Citizens with spe- 
cialized skills may be sought for certain cases, 
such as offenses involving juvenile offenders. In 
those cases, lay judges may be expected to have 
parenting experience or a degree in education, 
psychiatry, social work, or sociology (Kutnjak 
Ivkovic  ´2007; Catellani and Milesi 2006). Some 
countries explicitly prohibit selection from 
among occupations with legal education or expe- 
rience, such as professional judges, prosecutors, 
attorneys, or police officers; whereas in South 
Korea, soldiers, police officers, and firefighters 
are exempted from serving as lay judges because 
of the essential nature of their jobs. 
Typically, a presiding judge or a commission 
of the court reviews lists of randomly selected 
candidates. Candidates who meet the legal 
requirements are appointed or elected and will 
serve for a period of time (Malsch 2009). The 
process of selecting lay judges may be more or 
less democratic and transparent. Citizens may 
elect lay judges to serve and sit on trials intermit- 
tently throughout a period of several years 
(Kutnjak Ivkovic  ´ 2007). On the other hand, in 
some countries, important members of the com- 
munity such as mayors or municipal commis- 
sioners  appoint  potential  candidates  (Kaplan 
et al. 2006). To address transparency concerns, 
the president of the court in Italy posts lists of 
prospective lay judges in public places for mem- 
bers of the public to review. 
In reality, the selection process can be political 
and can preference certain segments of the pop- 
ulation. In Norway, a nomination committee 
picks candidates from among registered political 
 
party members. Some procedures or qualifica- 
tions will favor middle-class citizens, leading to  
a disproportionate number of middle-class lay 
judges. And in countries with a large immigrant 
population, citizenship requirements may create 
tribunals that do not represent the population. 
 
Lay Judges at Trial 
The numbers of lay and professional judges who 
sit at trial differs across the various jurisdictions 
and often corresponds to the severity of the case, 
with larger tribunals sitting for more serious 
cases. In Japan, six lay judges and three profes- 
sional judges decide guilt and sentencing in seri- 
ous felony cases (Fukurai 2011), whereas in 
Poland, only three panel members try less serious 
criminal cases. Other countries have different 
combinations of lay and professional judges 
depending on whether the crime is a lesser  
crime or a more serious felony offense. For exam- 
ple, in Germany, two lay assessors and one pro- 
fessional judge sit for most criminal cases, 
whereas two lay and three professional judges  
try the more serious crimes. In  South  Korea, 
five to nine lay judges sit in mixed courts, with 
nine lay judges participating in cases where the 
defendant could receive the death sentence or life 
imprisonment. And in Italy, six lay judges and 
two professional judges hear cases where the 
defendant  could  be  incarcerated  for  at  least 
24 years or life or where the crime is against the 
state (Catellani and Milesi 2006), whereas a law 
graduate appointed  as  an  honorary  judge  for   
a term of 4 years can decide misdemeanor crim- 
inal cases. As in some of the panels noted above, 
lay judges may outnumber professional judges. 
In many mixed court systems, lay judges 
decide all of the factual and legal issues in con- 
junction with the professional judges. This is not 
the case, however, in Japan. There, only the pro- 
fessional judge has the authority to determine 
questions of law and procedure. It is typical for   
a professional judge to control the trial. For 
example, a presiding professional judge may 
determine the trial date and summons the defen- 
dant and witnesses. In certain courts, the presid- 
ing judge will examine the witness before  other 
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members are allowed to speak. Lay judges can 
usually take an active role in the trial if they are so 
inclined. They may examine the evidence and 
question the witnesses including the defendant, 
either directly or indirectly through the profes- 
sional judge. 
The mixed court trial will work best when lay 
judges actively participate. Research indicates 
that professional judges, the presiding judge in 
particular, have a role to play in facilitating active 
lay participation. Lay judges are more likely to 
ask questions and participate in deliberations 
when encouraged to do so by professional judges. 
Lay judges are also more likely to be active 
during the trial and deliberations when they  
have special expert or technical knowledge that 
relates to the issues at trial. These were the find- 
ings of observers of mixed courts in Croatia, who 
noted that while expert lay judges were active at 
trial, regular lay judges asked questions only 
infrequently (Kutnjak Ivkovic  ´ 2007). This 
research also found that the legal professionals, 
the lawyers and judges, had more respect for the 
expert lay judges. 
Access to the case file or dossier affects the 
extent to which lay judges are able to do the work 
of assessing the evidence at trial. Germany pro- 
hibits lay judges from reviewing the case dossier 
and in France, only the presiding judge has access 
to the dossier (Hans and Germain 2011). Studies 
of mixed courts in Poland found that even though 
lay judges were allowed access to the dossier, 
most did not read the file. Access to the case 
dossier, laudable if one seeks equality of infor- 
mation between lay and professional judges, is 
nonetheless controversial in that it is prepared by 
the prosecution and often contains potentially 
biasing information such as a defendant’s crimi- 
nal record. Moving from a dossier-based trial to 
oral presentations, as was done in Japan, tends to 
equalize the information available to lay and pro- 
fessional judges. 
Several jurisdictions have formal rules about 
the deliberation and decision-making processes 
to ensure full and fair contributions by citizen 
participants. In Japan, the judgment must be 
agreed upon by a majority of the panel, with   at 
 
least one citizen and one professional in the 
majority. Norwegian lay judges must consent to 
the decision written by the professional judge 
(Malsch 2009). Other jurisdictions may provide 
for lay judges to vote on guilt or innocence before 
the professional judges give their verdicts. 
Research has shown, though, that even with for- 
mal requirements, lay judges often agree with 
professional judges, and rarely use their larger 
numbers to outvote them. A study in Sweden 
found that lay judges outvoted the professional 
judges in only 1–3 % of all criminal cases. In 
cases where lay judges disagree with professional 
judges, it is the lay judges who are likely to 
modify their opinion to resolve the disagreement 
(Kutnjak Ivkovic  ´2007). 
Nevertheless, lay participants tend to be posi- 
tive about their experiences, just as jurors usually 
are. More than 85 % of Croatian lay judges had            J      
positive opinions about their participation.  And 
in a study of Japanese citizen participation, 94 % 
of the  lay  judge  respondents  reported  having  
a positive experience. Lay judges believe they 
have a substantial and beneficial impact on ver- 
dicts. A study of German lay judges indicates that 
most respondents felt that the court would have 
decided differently “in a few cases” and only    
20 % responded that the court’s decision would 
have been the same without the participation of 
lay judges. 
Even though lay judges serve at the trial level, 
in most countries, appeals are decided by panels 
of professional judges only. Some exceptions 
include Sweden, which uses lay judges at the 
appellate level, but with a greater number of 
professional judges sitting on the panel, and 
France and Italy, which allow lay judges to  
serve in appeal courts.  Lay judges can also sit  
on certain post-conviction reviews in Germany. 
 
Sentencing Circles 
Another way that laypersons participate in the 
criminal trial is through sentencing circles 
(Goldbach 2010). In Canada, sentencing circles 
modeled on Aboriginal healing circles are being 
used at the sentencing phase of a criminal trial for 
adult    offenders    and    in   juvenile  diversion 
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programs, as a way to encourage Aboriginal par- 
ticipation in the criminal justice system. Sentenc- 
ing circles allow for a more restorative justice 
approach to sentencing, one that focuses on 
moral growth, constructive resolution of differ- 
ences, and empowerment of individuals and the 
community to take responsibility for harm done. 
The Canadian Department of Justice funds 
approximately 275 community-based justice com- 
mittees which provide all levels of criminal justice 
support. In these communities, the justice commit- 
tee works with the court to decide who will par- 
ticipate in sentencing circles and to identify a local 
community leader to act as keeper of the circle. In 
most cases, criminal justice participants, including 
the judge, the Crown prosecutor, defense counsel, 
the court reporter, the offender, the victim, and 
their respective families, form an inner circle. 
This inner circle can also include probation offi- 
cers, court workers, youth workers, or police offi- 
cers. Surrounding that circle is an outer circle of 
friends, relatives, and interested members of the 
community. Participants develop recommenda- 
tions for sentencing and present those to the 
judge. The procedure can be lengthy and demands 
substantial commitment from victims, defendants, 
and the community. 
Aboriginal communities participate in sen- 
tencing circles to construct sentences for such 
crimes as aggravated assault, assault causing 
bodily harm, robbery with violence, criminal 
harassment, breaking and entering, and arson. 
Judges are  less  likely  to  allow  a  request  for  
a sentencing circle following conviction of mur- 
der or manslaughter. The use of sentencing cir- 
cles is controversial, particularly in cases of 
domestic or sexual assault (Dickson-Gilmore 
and La Prairie 2005). However, this turn to com- 
munity sentencing reflects a trend in Canada and 
in other jurisdictions encouraging greater victim 
and community involvement in all parts of the 
criminal justice process, as well as a move away 
from incarceration and retributive justice toward 
more restorative sentencing approaches. For 
example, in Canada, the form that the punishment 
takes following a sentencing circle may involve 
a conditional sentence, where the offender serves 
 
the sentence in the community and undertakes to 
fulfill certain conditions such as doing commu- 
nity service or enrolling in drug or alcohol treat- 
ment programs. 
 
 
Controversies 
 
Sentencing circles, mixed courts, and juries share 
similar problems and are confronted by 
overlapping critiques, which are in  large  part 
due to apprehension over lay persons participat- 
ing in criminal trials. Concerns about lay compe- 
tency to grasp complicated legal and factual 
issues are common to both jury and mixed trial 
systems. Similarly, both juries and lay  judges 
face obstacles in accessing the full array of infor- 
mation that is available to professional judges. 
Lay judges in mixed courts confront the addi- 
tional challenge of having to overcome profes- 
sional judges’ control of the hearing and 
deliberation processes. On the other hand, inde- 
pendent juries are under pressure to make deci- 
sions about guilt or innocence on their own, and 
both jurors and sentencing circle participants 
must determine punishment without the benefit 
of the germane experiences or expert knowledge 
that professional judges possess. 
Research offers some reassurance. Studies 
indicate that lay participants are able to under- 
stand complex issues and often match judges in 
the accuracy of their decisions. In addition, stud- 
ies show that reforms of the trial system, such as 
allowing note taking, asking questions, mid-trial 
deliberations, and the use of notebooks to orga- 
nize the evidence, can increase the quality of lay 
citizen fact finding. Other controversies, how- 
ever, are less easily resolved. Even when proce- 
dures are enacted to ensure active participation, 
lay judges arguably play a minor role in mixed 
courts. And research confirms that juries are 
influenced by pretrial publicity about a case, by 
defendant characteristics such as criminal record, 
and by preexisting biases about particular types 
of crimes. It should be noted that professional 
judges are not immune to some of the same influ- 
ences. However, judges are generally required to 
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produce  written  reasons  which  are   thought  
to protect against biased or arbitrary decisions. 
Following this line of thinking, in 2009, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
overturned a jury conviction in Belgium, finding 
that the jury’s failure to provide reasons violated 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the 
European Convention of Human Rights  
(ECHR). To meet human rights requirements, 
jury verdicts must be justifiable in some fashion 
(Thaman 2011). Although the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court observed that the decision 
was not a general indictment of jury systems, 
merely an objection to the jury trial procedure   
in the specific case, it remains to be seen whether 
this will trigger a widespread call for juries to 
produce written reasons in Europe. 
Two additional controversies that have not yet 
been discussed are worth reviewing. The first is the 
problem of wrongful or erroneous convictions that 
become apparent when exculpatory DNA or other 
evidence comes to light. Juries in particular are at 
risk of being portrayed as error-prone and overly 
eager to convict when it comes to attributing 
blame for the conviction of an innocent defendant 
(Vidmar and Hans 2007). Thaman (2011) suggests 
that requiring juries to give reasons for their deci- 
sions would protect against convicting innocent 
defendants. Yet research shows that the most fre- 
quent cause of wrongful conviction, found in 
roughly 75 % of the cases, is mistaken eyewitness 
identification. A second important cause is false 
confessions. Thus, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases where a defendant is cleared by DNA 
evidence, the contributing factors relate to the 
evidence presented, not the jury’s decision- 
making ability. Research through the Innocence 
Project in Toronto, Canada, illustrates systemic 
pressures at the trial and investigation stage, either 
because a particular case has a high profile or 
because of other institutional pressures (Martin 
2002). This research suggests that a pressure to 
convict creates a bias in favor of building a case as 
opposed to solving the crime, which in turn shapes 
how police gather evidence and may even lead 
officials to disregard or suppress exculpatory 
evidence. 
 
A second troubling controversy relates to cap- 
ital punishment cases. Yet here too the problems 
are largely located in trial and court procedures as 
opposed to the fact of lay participation. In the early 
1970s, the US Supreme Court struck down all state 
death penalty statutes because of evidence of arbi- 
trariness, inconsistency, and racial bias in capital 
punishment decisions. Unfortunately, at that time, 
juries were given little guidance as to how to arrive 
at the decision to order a death sentence. Presently, 
state statutes require that juries consider or find 
certain aggravating circumstances before a death 
sentence can be ordered, reducing the impact of 
discretionary decision making. 
Jury selection in death penalty cases, however, 
continues to be a problem for fair and equal 
decision making. Where the prosecution intends 
to seek the death penalty, only those jurors who 
are willing to impose a death sentence are con-             J      
sidered  to  be  fair  and  impartial.  Yet research 
indicates that these individuals are more prone  
to convict. So-called “death-qualified” juries are 
more likely to believe the prosecution and have   
a general crime-control orientation which shapes 
their evaluation of the evidence. Analysis of cap- 
ital case outcomes in the USA reveals that the 
sentence is related to the race of the victim, with 
black defendants who kill white victims more 
likely to be sentenced to death than other race of 
defendant-race of victim combinations. Nonethe- 
less, the political, legal, and ethical justifications 
for including citizen input in a decision to sen- 
tence a defendant to death continue to be com- 
pelling. The US Supreme Court confirmed the 
importance  of   jury   determinations   in   Ring  
v Arizona  (2002).  That  decision  held  that  in   
a capital jury trial, at a minimum, the jury and 
not the judge must decide the elements that make 
a case eligible for the death penalty, whether they 
are components of the criminal offense or addi- 
tional aggravating factors. 
 
 
Conclusion: Future Research 
 
In the early decades of the twenty-first century, 
the  role  of  citizen  decision  making  in    legal 
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systems worldwide is at an interesting juncture. 
In many countries like the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Canada, where juries have 
been a prime fact finder for centuries, the jury 
lives on as a potent symbol of democracy even as 
the number of jury trials declines. Jurors are 
largely positive about their experiences and stud- 
ies indicate that participation on juries increases 
civic activity. Similarly, lay judges in mixed 
courts report being positive about their contribu- 
tions, even though they tend to play secondary 
roles compared to the professional judges. Sys- 
tematic research, from surveys of judges and 
juries in the United States in the 1950s to data 
collected on juries in South Korea between 2008 
and 2010, supports the basic soundness of lay 
decision making in that it corresponds consider- 
ably to professional decision making. On the 
other hand, research also reveals that sources of 
bias continue to influence both lay and profes- 
sional decision making in law. 
More recent experiments with juries and 
mixed courts of professional and lay judges pre- 
sent new opportunities for democratic decision 
making in a host of countries. These new systems 
also offer potential for greater theoretical under- 
standing and systematic scientific study. 
Research already underway in these countries 
will tell us much about what difference it makes 
to include laypersons in legal decision making. 
Because lay participation systems are introduced 
at particular points in time, researchers may be 
able to pinpoint their effects more precisely than 
has been possible in countries with long-standing 
jury and mixed court systems. 
Although there is now research on how jurors 
and lay judges react to their experiences, how the 
presence of lay citizens affects criminal defen- 
dants is largely unexplored. Advocates of sen- 
tencing circles propose the use of restorative 
justice approaches based on the assumption that 
the community’s active participation in sentenc- 
ing assists in rehabilitating the criminal defen- 
dant. This reasoned connection between 
democratic, accessible legal institutions and 
defendants’ experiences is theoretically robust 
and  suggests  several  research  questions.  Are 
 
defendants more willing to accept the verdict or 
punishment when recommendations or decisions 
are made by lay members of the community 
rather than by professional judges? Does the 
inclusion of lay perspectives increase or other- 
wise affect perceptions of procedural justice? 
These questions connect the conduct of trials 
with justifications for criminal punishment and 
therefore deserve further investigation. 
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Overview 
 
Jurors are assigned the arduous task of examining 
and processing copious amounts of evidence – in 
light of their legal instructions – to determine an 
appropriate verdict. While jurors do a relatively 
good job at sorting through the evidence and the 
law,  the  complex  nature  of  evidence  may  lie          J      
outside jurors’ “common knowledge,” and addi- 
tional education may aid jurors as they process 
such information. This is especially true in the 
domain of eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness tes- 
timony is extremely influential despite its poten- 
tial to be unreliable. Eyewitnesses may appear 
very confident in their identification of the perpe- 
trator, yet be completely mistaken. Indeed, over 
75 % of wrongful convictions overturned due to 
DNA testing have been linked to faulty eyewit- 
ness identifications. Unfortunately, traditional 
safeguards, such as cross-examination of eyewit- 
nesses, result in little improvement in jurors’ 
ability to discriminate between accurate and inac- 
curate eyewitness identifications. This has led the 
courts to establish additional safeguards against 
wrongful convictions based on faulty eyewitness 
identifications including the use of expert testi- 
mony and detailed instructions on how to evalu- 
ate eyewitness testimony. 
 
 
Jury Decision-Making Research 
 
Understanding how jurors make decisions has 
been a topic that has interested social scientists 
for the better part of a century. Legal decision 
making  has  been  studied  by  examining  both 
